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  John Dilworth
Abstract
My article, "Ariadne at the Movies," provided a detailed, double
film counter-example to the claim that films are types. Here I
defend my views against various criticisms provided by Aaron
Smuts. The defense includes some necessary clarification of
the Ariadne article's broader theoretical structure and
background, as well as some additional anti-type arguments to
further withstand his criticisms.
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1. Types and intentions
I am indebted to Aaron Smuts for his stimulating comments on
my Ariadne article.[1] But he oversimplifies my view about
types, and hence too easily dismisses a representational
account of filmic identity. My view is not that one token cannot
be an instance of two types, for of course it can, but instead
that it cannot be an instance of two types of the same general
kind. That qualification makes all the difference.
Here are some more examples to reinforce my original
example of dogs and cows being different types of animal--the
relevant general kind--so that no animal can be both a dog and
a cow. In the case of colors, which are types or universals--for
which a similar principle holds--then no color token can be both
red and green, since both are of the same general kind, i.e.
colors. Or in a more specific case, no token can be both dark
green and light green, because each type is of the same
general kind, namely some variety of green. Or with
manufactured types such as cars, if the type 'Ford car' is
genuinely distinct from the type 'GM car', then no particular car
can be both a Ford car and a GM car. And similarly, I continue
to claim, if artworks were types, then no two types that were
of the same general kind 'artwork' could share a single token.
Arguably, the relevant type-token principle is as secure as the
foundations of logic, since it is simply a more specialized form
of the principle that if an object has property, universal or type
Y, then it would be inconsistent to claim that it has some
related property Z of the same general kind, whose possession
would entail that it does not after all possess feature Y. For
example, no object can be both light green and dark green,
because being dark green entails that an object is not light
green, and no object can be both light green and not light
green. Thus, in sum, in any case in which two distinct artworks
are associated with a single concrete entity or event, such as a
length of film or film showing, some other, non-type account
must be given of the relevant relations, such as the suggested
representational account.
To be sure, this type-rejecting representational account should
be distinguished from various other general representational or
symbolic theories of art, such as that of Nelson Goodman in
Languages of Art, which itself is based--at least for 'allographic'
artworks--on an underlying type-token ontology.[2]
Nevertheless, to the extent that it is correct to view films as
being broadly symbolic, Smuts' counter-claim that film identity
can be defined independently of intentional criteria becomes
suspect, since the understanding of any symbol requires
interpretation that necessarily includes assumptions about the
intentions of the symbol users or creators.[3]

Also, independently of symbolic views of art, Arthur Danto's
insistence that interpretation is always required to transmute
'mere real things,' such as film reels or light patterns on a
screen, into genuine art also requires an intentionalistic view of
artworks. Further independent support for such an
intentionalistic view was included in the final section 7 of the
Ariadne paper, where I argued that type-based views of film
cannot explain the evident fact that films can and need to be
interpreted--a section that Smuts did not consider in his
comments. Also, Noël Carroll's own type-based view of film, as
well as of performance arts such as plays, does not prevent
him from also being a prominent defender of a variety of
'actual intentionalism' in the arts, including film cases. See,
e.g., his paper "Interpretation and Intention: The Debate
Between Hypothetical and Actual Intentionalism,"[4] which
includes arguments for the relevance of authorial intentions in
determining film identity in the case of controversial films such
as Stand By Me (1986).
As for the related issue of 'auteur' theories of film raised by
Smuts, we can agree that general theories of film based solely
on directorial intentions are oversimplified. But that at least
some films are best understood as the product of a director's
intentions is hardly a controversial claim in film circles--and my
anti-type example of distinct films Greed and Sacrifice,
produced by two independent directors Leslie and Steve, is
itself such a case.
At this point a further oversimplification in Smuts' description
of my view should be noted. Neither I, nor presumably anyone
else, wishes to identify a film with the intentions of its
creator(s), which I assume is what is implied by Smuts'
sentence "It is not clear if Grand Hotel should be identified with
the set designer at MGM, the producer, or with the director," or
in his attempted explanation of my view as "The claim seems
to mean that Leslie's film is whatever her intentions for it to be
are. . .." My actual view of film identity, as discussed in section
2 of the Ariadne paper, is, in summary form, that it is
successfully realized intentions plus causal factors that provide
the main criteria or necessary conditions for film identity. Thus,
to be explicit, on my view mere unrealized intentions as such
are irrelevant to film identity: it is only successfully realized
intentions that are relevant. This point also takes care of
Smuts' 'splintering' argument, that if I were right then classical
films such as Gone with the Wind might splinter into various
different films, each associated with the differing intentions of
one of the major persons involved in its production.[5] Such a
concern would again conflate the raw, initial intentions of
various participants in a film project with the successfully
realized intentions that provide one necessary condition of film
identity on my account. Thus it is only those differences in
intentions that somehow manage to survive the actual
filmmaking process that are relevant to issues about the
identity of the resulting film or films.
In my example I detailed some of the agonizing, draconian
procedures that would be necessary in order to ensure that
both Steve and Leslie could successfully realize their
significantly different film intentions within the same concrete
film production project. But in actual rather than hypothetical
projects, I have seen no evidence to date that any actual
participants in film productions have been willing to go to such
extreme lengths to ensure that more than one film resulted
from their combined efforts. So Smuts' fears of splintering in
classic film productions are groundless.

As for the associated causal factors that also provide necessary
conditions of film identity, in tandem with intentional factors,
clearly there is a complex and intimate connection between the
actions of a director that successfully realize her intentions,
and the relevant causal factors in the production process. My
claim is that the outcome of that causal process is able to
represent those film-related intentions of the director that were
successfully realized by the process.
This clarification enables a further criticism of the type view to
be given. Any parallel intentionalistic type-based account
presumably would have to say that the final length of film
instantiates or exemplifies, rather than represents, those
successful intentions. But such a view seems metaphysically
confused: how could a physical length of film be an actual
example or instance of the relevant directorial intentions, and
how could those intentions themselves be types rather than
tokens? Thus the very coherence of a specifically intentionalist
type theory of film, or of any art form for that matter, is in
serious doubt.
Returning to causal factors, Smuts is skeptical even of the
conceivability, let alone the actual possibility, of qualitatively
identical but causally independent lengths of film, and
consequently gets bogged down in irrelevant issues of
replication or copying. However, here I am doing no more than
providing a film 'thought experiment' analogous to Danto's
generally accepted point that, e.g., a series of qualitatively
identical, independently produced red squares might each have
a different artistic status from the others (or no artistic status
at all). For example, if we found evidence on Mars of an
ancient film-making civilization, including a reel of film
qualitatively identical to that of Orson Welles' film Citizen Kane,
my point is that the Martian reel of film could not be, or could
not embody, the film Citizen Kane, because of its causal
independence from Welles' actual film product. Its finding
would be a remarkable coincidence, but it could not provide an
identical film. Indeed, in the absence of any evidence of the
intentions of the Martian producers of the film-reel, we could
not even assume that it involved a film that was an artwork at
all.
There is also a dual or inverse issue to consider, that of the
possibility that qualitatively different film reels might
nevertheless embody the same film, about which Smuts also
expresses puzzlement, such as in my section 2 claim that
"Leslie's film-making activities could have produced a
numerically distinct template L', but since L' would have still
been the causal outcome of Leslie's activities, it would have
still counted as embodying Leslie's film Greed." Here I was
defending the 'modal flexibility' of film-making, that possible
minor differences in batches of film, on-set props and so on,
would not prevent the result from embodying the same film.
This intuitively compelling modal flexibility point also provides
yet another problem for type theories--they cannot explain it,
because types as abstract entities could not have been
different from what they actually are, and hence their tokens
could not have been different either. But with my alternative
representational explanation, there is no such problem, since it
is a familiar point that different concrete representations could
still represent the same item.
As for what it means to say that a length of film X 'embodies'
or 'involves' a film Y, as also queried by Smuts, this is just a
colloquial, more intuitive form of the theoretical claim that X
represents Y--my alternative to the parallel type-theoretical

claim that X is a token of type Y.
2. The possibility of a double film example
Turning now to the general issue of the possibility of a double
film example such at that of Leslie's film Greed and Steve's film
Sacrifice, let me start, as in the case of types, with a
clarification of the theoretical situation. The general idea is
that, for those who accept a broadly intentionalistic theory of
art, insofar as artistic intentions are not simply physical events,
there will inevitably be some looseness of fit between a
finished artistic artifact, such as a reel of film--along with the
causal processes that produced it--and the possibly distinct
intentions of those involved in its production. As an initial
implication of this point, Danto's example of several
qualitatively identical red squares may again be invoked--each
being the result of differing artistic (or non-artistic) intentions,
which hence result in non-identical artworks (or non-artworks).
Thus here we already have the possibility that qualitatively
identical physical results, whether paintings, reels of film or
whatever, could be associated with distinct artworks--as in the
case of the Martian Citizen Kane look-alike reel mentioned
above.
However, Danto's example by itself is of no immediate help in
refuting type theories, since each of the resulting red squares
is a numerically distinct physical object, and there is no
conclusive theoretical bar to distinct tokens, even of
qualitatively identical objects, being of different types of the
same general kind. Example: as long as the written tokens of
Cervantes' Don Quixote are distinct from written tokens of
Menard's Don Quixote--the latter as envisaged by Borges[6]-then even though the relevant sets of tokens are qualitatively
identical, they might still be tokens of distinct artistic types of
the same kind 'artwork.'
Nevertheless, if a way could be found in which distinct artistic
intentions could each be expressed within a single causal
process and result, then the intentionalistic 'looseness of fit'
already referred to would result in distinct artworks that could
after all be used to refute type theories--which I claim to have
done, both in the current film example, and with analogous
test cases in other art forms.[7]
Smuts questions whether my somewhat elaborate double film
example is really necessary to make my point, proposing
instead "...a single physical film that moves from a blue screen
to a black screen to a black screen with a white dot," which
length of film is screened under separate titles Drowning and
Flight. To which he adds, "If your intuitions are like mine, you
will want to say that Drowning and Flight are two separate
films. What we have is a Danto inspired case of perceptually
indiscernible objects that are different." He concludes his
alternative case by saying, "Viewers at different screenings or
with differently titled tickets would come away with radically
different notions of what each phase of the film represented."
Smuts agrees that two distinct films can be associated with a
single length of film stock, picks up on the relevance of Danto,
makes parallel points to mine about distinct titles, and even
talks of "...what each phase of the film represented." If viable,
Smuts' example of two distinct films sharing a single token
would provide the basis for a parallel but non-intentionalistic
anti-type argument, hence extending my result, which is
specifically targeted at intentionalistic type theories of art, to
type theories of art in general. Nevertheless, Smuts seems not
to realize that, in thus defending his own alternative example,

he is thereby undercutting his own pro-type approach to film,
and in addition apparently accepting a representational
approach in its place.
There are several reasons as to why I chose to present a more
developed example. One is a matter of scale: Smuts' example
is a toy rather than a full-blown case of distinct films using
numerically the same physical resources, which could be
dismissed as involving merely two minor film experiments or
sketches rather than two distinctive filmic artworks in the full
sense. Also, the detailed defenses of my proposal against
various objections in sections 3-5 of the Ariadne paper would
not be possible without a comprehensive example. Another
reason is that issues of intentionality are left in a nascent or
unresolved state in Smuts' simplified example.
This is shown by the fact the example faces the following
dilemma: Either it does in fact involve two distinct kinds of
intentionality, as shown by its maker's decision to title it in two
different ways that suggest distinct intentionalistic
interpretations of it (i.e., of what I called 'identifying
interpretations' in section 7 of the Ariadne paper, that identify
two distinct artworks rather than just interpret one or more
pre-existing artworks), in which case the example is simply a
drastically scaled-down version of an example such as mine.
Or, on the other horn of the dilemma, if Smuts' example
genuinely does involve no film intentionality at all, then the
showing of the length of film is no more than a physical event
of light being projected on a screen in certain configurations,
so that it does not qualify as a showing of even one filmic
artwork, let alone of two. This interpretation of the example is
also suggested by Smuts' emphasis on presentational as
opposed to intentional factors: I would explain that
interpretation as a case where one or more showings of the
length of film are presented or interpreted as a showing of two
distinct films, without its actually being the case that any
genuine film is shown. (And in general, objects or events may
be used as if they were artworks--i.e., as if they represented
artworks on my theory--even if they are not in fact artworks or
representations of such). Hence, either the example provides
further supporting evidence for my intentionalistic anti-type
argument, or it fails to provide a relevant example at all.
Thus in conclusion, I would claim to have further reinforced, in
the face of Smuts' spirited opposition, the anti-type arguments
of the Ariadne paper. The intentionality of artistic activities and
products cannot consistently, and perhaps not even coherently,
be explained within a type-theoretic framework, so attention
should now shift to alternatives such as the suggested
representational account.
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